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tārīsa-. But certain evidence, namely the testimony of the dialect of the Girnār redaction of Asoka's Fourteen-Edicts, has hitherto been overlooked. It should be noticed that in this dialect we have *d* everywhere consistently for Indic *d* except apparently in *tārīsa-*, *etārīsa-*, *yārīsa-*; but it should be observed that in these cases we have *r* consistently; cf. *per contra*, *dbādasa* (Skt. *dvādaśa*) and *trāidasa* (Skt. *trayodaśa*). This shows at once that no matter what the origin of the *r* in Pāli *bārāsa* (Skt. *dvādaśa*) is, the *r* of Pāli *tārīsa-* must be judged quite apart from it. In short, the evidence thus far adduced is rather against the equation of Girnār, Pāli, and Prākrit *tārīsa-* with Sanskrit *tādrīsa-*. And there is further reason for the rejection of this etymology. Indic *r* is often represented in both Pāli and Prākrit by *i*, but in the Girnār dialect outside of *tārīsa-*, *etārīsa-*, *yārīsa-* as is ordinarily assumed, there is not a single case where such correspondence is found. *Per contra* note *kacam* (i. e. *kaccam*) as contrasted with Pāli *kiccam* (Skt. *kṛtyam*). But it will be objected that the *a* of *kacam* is in no sense decisive, as it might be due to the analogy of *kata-* (Skt. *kṛta-*). That is true; yet at the same time the burden is on those who maintain that *tārīsa-* corresponds to Sanskrit *tādrīsa-* to show that Indic *r* can become *i* in the Girnār dialect. Taking into consideration the first objection I raised against Pischel and Brugmann, I think we have sufficient evidence to warrant us in rejecting the equation of Girnār *tārīsa-* with Sanskrit *tādrīsa-*, and for accepting the equation of Girnār *tārīsa-* with Greek *τηλίκος*. Girnār *yārīsa-* then would be the correspondent to Greek *χλίκος*. Girnār *etārīsa-* can either be an old inherited word or a new formation based on the relation of *ta-* : *eta-*. It is, I need scarcely add, highly improbable to separate Pāli and Prākrit *tārīsa-*, etc., from Girnār *tārīsa-*, etc.

The fact of not finding any correspondence in Sanskrit to *tārīsa-* need cause no alarm. As a matter of fact, not a single dialect of all the inscriptions of Asoka, nor any of the Prākrit dialects, nor Pāli is a direct linear descendant from Sanskrit.

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HOMER *ILIAS* 24. 367 AND PLATO *REPUBLIC* 492C

*τῶν εἴ τίς σε ἰδοιτο θοήν δὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν
τοσσάδ' ὄνειατ' ἄγοντα, τίς ἀν δὴ τοι νόος εἴη;*

The scholiast (Dindorf, Vol. IV, p. 351) interprets *τί διανοήσῃ*; *τί εργάσῃ*; Monro renders "what would be your device for escape?" Leaf's last edition comments: "*vóos expedient as I, 104, e 23,*" etc. Similarly Ebelung's lexicon and the majority of editors. On the other hand,

Eustathius has *ἢ γονν τί νοεῖς παθεῖν*; and Ameis translates “Wie würde dir dann nur zu Muthe sein?” which I think is certainly right. The word *νόος* may, of course, have either meaning. Nearly all terms for “mind” may be used in the looser or in the more precise sense, and, in particular, words of predominantly cognitive connotations may be used of the affective nature. Conversely, words of emotional suggestion may refer to the intelligence. In this passage the emotional or affective sense is the more appropriate—What then would be your plight, your state of mind? How would you feel then? This is probably the force of *νόος* above, 358: *σὺν δὲ γέροντι νόος χύτῳ, δεῖδε δ' αἰνῶς*, where it would be a mistake to understand it specifically of *intellectual* confusion. In *Iliad* 3. 63, *νόος ἀτάροβητος*, parallel to *κραδή* in 60, there can be no question but that the affective meaning predominates. In *Odyss.* 8. 78, *χαῦρε νόω*, the rendering “mit Bedacht” apparently rests on the idea that the dative must be instrumental. It is rather locative like *θυμῷ* and *φρεσὶ* in similar uses, Monro, *Hom. Gram.* 145. 3.

If we take *νόος*, then, of the feelings, we have in our passage the beginning of an idiomatic turn of phrase quite common in the later literature, though frequently overlooked. It occurs in Plato *Rep.* 492C, where, in spite of the warning *τὸ λεγόμενον*, the commentators, with the partial exception of Adam, generally ignore it: *ἐν δὴ τῷ τουούτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον, τίνα οἴει καρδίαν ἴσχειν*; The best parallel for this is Eurip. *I. A.* 1173: *τίν' ἐν δόμοις με καρδίαν ἔξειν δοκέῖς, ὅταν*. That the specific word *καρδία* is not essential to the usage appears from Dem. 28. 21: *εἰ δ' ὑμεῖς ἄλλο τι γνώσεσθε . . . τίνα οἴεσθε αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔξειν*; and 50. 62: *τίνα με οἴεσθε ψυχὴν ἔχειν ἢ πόσα δάκρυα ἀφίεναι*;

With slightly different suggestion, Lysias 32. 12 has *τίνα ποτὲ ψυχὴν ἔχων δέξιοι*; In Plato *Symp.* 219D, *δάκρυα* is substituted: *τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο τίνα οἴεσθε με διάνουαν ἔχειν*; where again the commentators, including Hug-Schöne, are silent. Isocrates frequently substitutes *γνώμην* in essentially emotional contexts, e. g., 6. 77: *τίνα γὰρ οἱηθῶμεν αὐτὸὺς γνώμην ἔξειν ὅταν*; 14. 15: *οὐσ τίνα χρῆ προσδοκῶν γνώμην ἔξειν ἢν ἀκούσωσιν*, etc.; 14. 48: *τίνα γὰρ ἡμᾶς οἴεσθε γνώμην ἔχειν ὁρῶντας*, etc. Similarly 17. 10 and 19. 22, etc. Cf. also *ποίαν . . . γνώμην* [Lys.] 2. 35, and *τίνα γνώμην οἴεσθε ἔξειν τοὺς μύστας* [Lys.] 6. 5. If Blass had realized the frequency of the phrase he would hardly have used its occurrence in Isoc. *Plat.* 48 and *Aeginet.* 22 as a proof of common authorship in *Att. Bered.* Vol. II, p. 239, n. 4.

Lastly it may be observed that similar turns are common in Latin, e. g., Ovid *Heroides* 7. 65: *quid tibi mentis erit?* Cic. *Manil. Law* 6: *quo tandem animo esse putatis?* Verg. *Aen.* 4. 408: *quis tibi tum, Dido, cernenti talia sensus?*